The Moral Wager: Evolution and Contract (Philosophical Studies Series)

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This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don't do unto others without their consent.
From this advice, some significant implications for moral theory follow. First, we cannot view morality as a categorical imperative. Secondly, we cannot hope to offer rational justification for adopting moral advice. This is where Glaucon and Adeimantus went astray: they wanted a proof of the benefits of morality in every single case. That is not possible. Moral constraint is a bad bet taken in and of itself. But there is some good news: moral constraint is a good bet when examined statistically.
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The Moral Wager: Evolution and Contract (Philosophical Studies Series) Review
Murray presents himself as a "reductive natural irrealist": "reductive" because he believes that morality can be reduced to talk about something specific about the world, "natural" because he believes that what moral questions can have true/false answers, and "irrealism" because (as contradictory as it sounds) Murray believes that there are no exiting moral facts. What he defends in this book is the idea that morality can be justified via game theory and the prisoner's dilemma, but is always hypothetical rather than categorical in nature. We can justify morality, somewhat, to Hobbes's "foole" who demands that we appeal to his self-interest about why he should be moral. Morality, Murray says, boils down to the idea that we should not do unto others without their permission, and conditionally cooperate with others.
The first part of the book largely argues against prevailing views of morality, and specifically the Kantian demand that it be categorical. First, it is just impossible to find a universally applicable rule that deals with every type of person and situation appropriately (while, I might add, not being impossibly vague, like "Treat everyone as they deserve.") Second, for many rules, it just isn't clear whether they are categorical or really hypothetical; Murray's example is "Don't cheat in golf," which is an open question of whether it applies to everyone including non-golfers, or whether it is a hypothetical imperative that applies only to those who play golf. And then, there are demands of justifying moral imperatives by appeal to reason, which also tend to fall short because it is quite clear that morality sometimes demands the very irrational idea of sacrificing of oneself while either not gaining or not gaining anything close to what was sacrificed.
One can, though, "justify" morality by arguing that it has evolutionary fit. Many books have been written on how morality likely evolved and how its presence benefited the species. Per Richard Joyce (The Evolution of Morality (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology), though, this does not mean that morality will benefit agents here and now. But Murray has another strategy: using game theory and the prisoner's dilemma, we can at least show that agents who are CONDITIONAL cooperators do better on average than universal cooperators and universal defectors (given a population where there are at least some other conditional cooperators). Murray's "consent theory" is basically the idea that one should cooperate with others when there is reason to believe you have their consent, and not when there isn't.
The tough thing for many to accept about this view - and Murray does a good job admitting and defending it - is that it falls well short of what many of us want in a justification for morality. We want some categoricity and reason to be moral even when it is removed from our self-interest; there is a feeling that if we can't separate morality from self-interest, the project just fails. Murray is more modest and (like Mandeville, probably) points out that humans, being mostly self-interested as they are, will not likely get. or follow, such categorical imperatives when their self-interest drastically conflicts with them. The best we can do, maybe, is to realize that conditional cooperation - being nice to others when we have reason that they will be nice to us - is the best real-life justification for morality that we may get.
Now, there is another (what I consider a) flaw in the book, and it may be a rather large one. What Murray is talking about is only a slice of what many folks will consider to be morality. Reciprocal altruism is certainly a type of altruism, but it also leaves out many other acts - like giving to charity or helping those I could help at low cost to myself even when I don't expect the favor returned - that people would consider to be moral. Now, fortunately, I agree to a large extent with Murray's assessment that in these situations, failing to give x to alleviate y is not the same as causing y, such that giving money to the starving to alleviate hunger is not equivalent to causing hunger. And unless one can find a reason why I have a duty to alleviate that which I bear no blame in causing, we are justified in taking a more minimal view of what morality requires (a la Jan Narveson). But this may be a problem for those who don't share that intuition and refuse to see anything that can't justify, say, a duty to alleviate the poor's suffering, as something shy of morality. To them, Murray will probably have failed, but it will be up to them to argue why.
This is a pretty hard to read book with a lot of philosophic and game theoretic jargon. That is okay if you are a very experienced philosopher and don't mind re-reading paragraphs several times. But if you are like me, and find amoralism or error theory a bit to minimal, but utilitarian and Kantian moralities a bit too....impossible, The Moral Wager is well worth the attempt.
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